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The Due Process Revolution and the Juvenile
Court: The Matter of Race in the Historical
Evolution of a Doctrine*
Gary A. Debele**
I. Introduction
On June 8, 1964, fifteen-year old Gerald Gault and his friend
Ronald Lewis were taken into custody by the sheriff of Gila
County, Arizona. A neighbor, Mrs. Cook, had filed a verbal com-
plaint with the local police alleging that a caller or callers had
made lewd or indecent remarks to her over the telephone. Gerald
and Ronald became the primary suspects. At the time Gerald was
picked up for these allegations, his parents did not receive notice
as to the complaint or the fact that he had been taken into
custody.'
By today's standards of procedural due process, the events
which followed are truly shocking. The petition filed by the police
officer was never served upon Gerald's parents and it made no ref-
erence to any factual basis supporting the judicial action which it
initiated.2 The day after Gerald was taken into custody, his
mother and brother appeared in chambers before the juvenile
court judge. The complainant, Mrs. Cook, was not there; none of
the participants were sworn in; no transcript, recording, or memo-
randum of the proceeding was made. 3
The judge did not make a decision at the time of this proceed-
* This article was awarded the Steven M. Block, Prize for Civil Rights and
Civil Liberties Scholarship. Professor Block, a 1976 graduate of the Stanford Law
School, joined the University of Minnesota Law School faculty in 1983. Upon his
sudden death in October 1984, Professor Block's friends and family created this
prize to commemorate Professor Block's dedication of so much of his professional
career to furthering individual rights.
** B.A., St. Olaf College; J.D., University of Minnesota; currently pursuing an
M.A. in history at the University of Minnesota with a concentration in American
legal and constitutional history. The author would like to express his appreciation
to Professor Barry Feld, under whose guidance and in whose juvenile justice course
at the University of Minnesota many of the ideas expressed in this article were
raised, discussed, and developed.
1. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1967).
2. Id. at 5.
3. Id.
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ing and Gerald returned to the juvenile detention home. Several
days later Gerald did go home, but his parents never received an
explanation why their son had been detained before being sent
home. At the subsequent hearing the due process violations con-
tinued. Again the court failed to keep a record of the proceeding.
Mrs. Cook was not present, with the judge finding her presence
not necessary. In fact, the judge himself never even spoke to Mrs.
Cook. Gerald's parents never saw a referral report made by proba-
tion officers and filed at this hearing.4 Although the listed charge
was simply "lewd phone calls,"5 Gerald received a harsh sentence.
He was ordered to spend the remainder of his minority-six
years-at the State Industrial School.6
Because Arizona did not permit appeals in juvenile cases,
Gerald's parents filed a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the con-
stitutionality of the Arizona Juvenile Code.7 First, they alleged
the Juvenile Code was unconstitutional because it failed to require
notice of the hearing, did not provide for a right of appeal, and did
not require that the parents and the alleged offender be apprised
of the specific charges. Second, Mr. and Mrs. Gault claimed that
the proceedings against Gerald violated his constitutional rights to
counsel, to confront all witnesses, to assert the privilege against
self-incrimination, and to have a record made of the proceeding.
Finally, they argued that the juvenile court had erred when it re-
moved Gerald from their custody without first establishing their
unsuitability as parents.8
The state superior court dismissed the request for the writ of
habeas corpus,9 and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed.10 Mr.
and Mrs. Gault then sought review by the United States Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court reversed the Arizona courts and held
that the proceedings to which Gerald Gault had been subjected of-
fended the requirements of due process of law."
After In re Gault, juveniles were guaranteed notice of the
charges filed against them, the right to have counsel present at the
trial and at certain pre-trial proceedings,12 the right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses,13 the right to be free from self-in-
4. Id. at 6-8.
5. Id. at 7.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 8.
8. Id. at 9-10.
9. Id. at 9.
10. Id. at 10.
11. Id. at 59.
12. Id. at 33-34.
13. Id. at 35-42.
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crimination,14 the right to appellate review, and the right to be
provided with a transcript of the proceedings.' 5
The Arizona Juvenile Court's treatment of Gerald Gault re-
flects the notions and practices of an institution created during the
first two decades of the twentieth century. During that period-
referred to by historians as the "Progressive Era"' 6-the outlines
of the juvenile court systems of this country emerged as they
would remain until the landmark Gault decision in 1967.
Progressive reformers created juvenile courts during a period
of historical transition in which the United States evolved from a
predominantly rural and agricultural nation into a major urban
and industrial nation.17 Immense societal changes accompanied
this transformation and greatly disturbed the reformers with their
preference for order, efficiency, and controlled environments. The
Progressives especially feared for the well-being of the children
living and working within the cities of that period-cities teeming
with immigrant masses, burgeoning crime rates, and dangerous
factories.' 8
Leading Progressive reformers in Chicago created the first
juvenile court in 1899 with hopes of protecting and rehabilitating
"delinquent" children whom they believed had been corrupted by
these urban surroundings.19 Regardless of the nature of the of-
fense, Progressives stressed rehabilitation under the direction of
numerous "professionals" and "experts" who claimed to apply ra-
tional and scientific methods.20 Progressive juvenile reformers re-
14. Id. at 42-57.
15. Id. at 57-59.
16. See infra note 18.
17. See generally William L. O'Neill, The Progressive Years: America Comes of
Age (1975); Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (1967).
18. Robert M. Mennel, Thorns and Thistles: Juvenile Delinquents in the United
States, 1825-1940, at 154-55 (1973). For discussions of American progressivism and
American society during those years, see generally O'Neill, supra note 17; Wiebe,
supra note 17. According to Robert H. Wiebe, "If humanitarian progressivism had
a central theme, it was the child. He united the campaigns for health, education,
and a richer city environment and he dominated much of the interest in labor legis-
lation .... The most popular version of legal and penal reform also emphasized
the needs of youth." Wiebe, supra note 17, at 169.
19. Mennel, supra note 18, at 129-32. See also Graham Parker, The Juvenile
Court Movement" The Illinois Experience, 26 U. Toronto L.J. 140, 153-67 (1976).
Leading reformers active in the juvenile court movement in Chicago included Jane
Addams, Julia Lathrop, Florence Kelly, Lucy Flower, Ethel Sturges Dummer, and
John Dewey. Id. at 153.
20. Joseph Kett, Rites of Passage: Adolescence in America, 1790 to the Present
215 (1977); David J. Rothman, Conscience and Convenience: The Asylum and Its
Alternatives in Progressive America 43 (1980); Mennel, supra note 18, at 102-06,
124-26, 145-46, 152-53; Larry J. Siegel & Joseph J. Senna, Juvenile Delinquency:
Theory, Practice, and Law 68-91 (1981).
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ceived the support of the state through the doctrine of parens
patriae.2 1 Juvenile court judges and reformers maintained that
the juvenile court proceedings resembled civil proceedings. The
goal was not punishment, but rehabilitation in a setting where the
court placed itself in the position of a gently guiding parent steer-
ing a wayward child back to the path of "correct" behavior. The
juvenile court reformers regarded a rigid adherence to the stan-
dard criminal procedures of the day or to any concept of adver-
sarial procedural due process as irrelevant and ultimately
detrimental to the best interests of the child.22
Sixty-eight years after the creation of the first juvenile court
in Chicago, the United States Supreme Court handed down the In
re Gault 23 decision. In the decision of the Court, the majority ex-
pressed its disagreement with the Progressive methods which were
still being used. The Court took umbrage with the long standing
claims that the juvenile court, through its methods, looked out for
the best interests of the child.24 With the appearance of Gault, the
"due process revolution" 25 entered the realm of juvenile justice.
By the 1960s, the Progressive world view upon which the juvenile
21. Scholars frequently cite the English Chancery Court as the creator of this
doctrine. It simply means that the state is viewed as responsible for the well-being
of children in situations where parental direction is lacking. Accordingly, the state
was expected to treat the delinquent or neglected child in the same manner as
would a kind and loving parent. Under the English Chancery system, the king, act-
ing as the father of his country, freely exercised control over the children of the
realm. Arnold Binder, The Juvenile Justice System:v Where Pretense and Reality
Clash, 22 Am. Behavioral Scientist 624-26 (July-Aug. 1979); Orm W. Ketcham, The
Development of Juvenile Justice in the United States, in The Changing Faces of Ju-
venile Justice 11-13 (V. Lorne Stewart ed. 1978).
22. Binder, supra note 21, at 627. Mennel, supra note 18, at 138-44; Parker,
supra note 19, at 267-74, 276-82. For a more detailed discussion of the creation and
functioning of the early juvenile courts, see generally James M. Inverarity, Pat
Lauderdale & Barry C. Feld, Law and Society: Sociological Perspectives on Crimi-
nal Law (1983); Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure
for the Juvenile Court, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 141 (1984); Ellen Ryerson, The Best-Laid
Plans: America's Juvenile Court Experiment (1978); Steven L. Schlossman, Love
and the American Delinquent: The Theory and Practice of "Progressive" Juvenile
Justice, 1825-1920 (1977); Robert M. Mennel, supra note 18.
23. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
24. The language of the opinion itself best captures this challenge to the old
Progressive notions. According to Justice Fortas:
Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a
kangaroo court .... So wide a gulf between the State's treatment of
the adult and of the child requires a bridge sturdier than mere verbi-
age, and reasons more persuasive than cliche can provide. As Wheeler
and Cottrell have put it, "The rhetoric of the juvenile court movement
has developed without any necessarily close correspondence to the re-
alities of court and institutional routines."
387 U.S. at 28-30.
25. This term was coined and used as a theme by Fred Graham, The Self-In-
flicted Wound (1970).
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court had been premised was dramatically out of step with a na-
tion in the midst of a legal and social revolution.
The Progressive Era and the Warren Court have both re-
ceived extensive study, making it a fairly easy task to compare and
contrast their divergent methods of dealing with juvenile offend-
ers.26 The more difficult endeavor involves accounting for why the
"due process revolution" and "constitutional domestication of the
juvenile court"27 occurred in 1967 when the Supreme Court
handed down In re Gault. The purpose of this article is to con-
sider the historical and jurisprudential developments between the
Progressive Era and the 1960s and thereby explain why Gault oc-
curred when it did.28
An explanation for the occurrence of this constitutional do-
mestication can be reached through a two-part analysis. The first
26. See supra note 18; see, e.g., Graham, supra note 25; Alexander M. Bickel,
The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress (1970); Archibald Cox, The Warren
Court: Constitutional Decision as an Instrument of Reform (1968); Louis M.
Kohlmeier, Jr., God Save This Honorable Court! (1972).
27. Professor Barry Feld has entitled a subsection of an article "The Constitu-
tional Domestication of the Juvenile Court;" see Feld, supra note 22. In that sub-
section he offers this summary of the events leading to Gault:
Despite occasional challenges and criticism of some conceptual or ad-
ministrative aspects of juvenile justice, no sustained and systematic ex-
amination of the juvenile court occurred until the 1960s. In 1967,
however, In re Gault began a "due process revolution" that substan-
tially transformed the juvenile court from a social welfare agency into
a legal institution. This "constitutional domestication" was the first
step in the convergence of the procedures of the juvenile justice sys-
tem with those of the adult criminal process.
Feld, supra note 22, at 151 (citations omitted).
28. This method of explaining and accounting for the dramatic legal, political
and cultural events which occurred during the Warren Court era is not unique.
Godfrey Hodgson in America in Our Time (1976), explained it this way:
The more I thought about the political preconceptions with which
Americans entered the 1960s, the more clearly it seemed to me that
these had been shaped by the great events of the 1940s and early 1950s:
by World War 11 and by the Cold War, by the end of the Depression
and the coming of affluence, by the emergence of the United States as
a global power, by the Stalinist threat and the McCarthyite response
to it in the United States and finally by the great migrations from the
country to town, from city to suburb, from East to West, and from
South to North.
Id. at 502.
George E. Mowrey & Blaine A. Brownell in The Urban Nation, 1920-1980
(1981), looked at the transformation of American life during the past 60 years
through the rapid growth of cities and the accompanying emergence of a mass-pro-
duction, mass-consumption society: "[These forces have produced a three-fold
revolution in the United States shifting the center of social, economic, and political
power from the country to the city, strenthening and converting the hesitant world
power of the 1914-1918 war into the dominant superpower of the 1980s." Id. at viii.
See also Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress (1970).
Law and Inequality
step involves the seminal Brown v. Board of Education 29 decision
which the Supreme Court handed down in 1954. An analysis of
the due process revolution in the juvenile justice system must be-
gin by explaining why Brown occurred when it did. The second
part of the analysis deals with the application of Brown principles
to juvenile offenders and can be analyzed by looking at the ways in
which various" segments of American society began working in the
late 1950s and throughout the 1960s towards full implementation
of the Brown decision's dictate of equal treatment. During this pe-
riod a constitutional revolution began and extended due process
and equal protection doctrines to Blacks,3 0 criminal defendants, 31
children,32 women,33 illegitmate persons, 34 aliens35 and juvenile of-
fenders.3 6 Race was the underlying issue of the Brown decision as
well as the underlying motivation for the subsequent civil rights
movement,37 and Blacks were the most visibly oppressed segment
29. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Although it may seem rather odd looking to a case de-
cided on equal protection grounds as a precursor to Gault, which was decided on
the basis of procedural due process, constitutional historian Paul L. Murphy deals
with this problem when he explains how the Supreme Court was able to apply
equal protection doctrine to force the District of Columbia to desegregate its
schools:
Although the Fifth Amendment did not contain an equal protection
clause, Warren maintained that the concepts of due process of law and
equal protection of the law both stemmed from "our American ideal of
fairness" and while they were not interchangeable, it was true that
discrimination could be so unjustifiable as to be a violation of due
process.
Paul L. Murphy, Constitution in Crisis Times, 1918-1969, at 313 (1972).
30. See infra note 156, 178.
31. See infra note 177.
32. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (extended
first amendment protection of non-disruptive symbolic speech to school children).
33. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (struck down a law preferring
males to females when two persons were otherwise equally entitled to be the ad-
ministrator of an estate); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (held viola-
tive of equal protection a federal statute permitting male members of the armed
services an automatic dependency allowance for their wives but requiring ser-
vicewomen to prove their husbands were dependent).
34. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (held that the denial to illegit-
imate children of the right to recover for wrongful death of their mother on whom
they were dependent was invidious and wrongful discrimination).
35. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (Supreme Court for the
first time treated classifications based on alienage as inherently suspect and subject
to close judicial scrutiny; the Court struck down a state imposition of a residency
requirement on aliens receiving welfare benefits).
36. See, e.g., In re Gault, 327 U.S. 1 (1967); see infra note 206.
37. In his discussion of the historical and sociological significance of the Brown
decision, James M. Inverarity also points to the race question as being the core cata-
lyst of the due process revolution:
The Brown decision has come to be viewed by many observers as
marking the beginning of the Civil Rights Revolution-a combination
of Court decisions, legislation, and social activism that changed dra-
[Vol. 5:513
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within American society.38 It is therefore this author's belief that
the issue of race was the most significant catalyst for a society-
wide due process revolution which would also encompass juveniles
appearing before juvenile courts. Indeed, the issue of race is the
single most important factor linking the two parts of this
analysis.39
II. Historical Developments leading to the Brown Decision.
What follows is a decade-by-decade assessment of the societal
changes occurring within the United States which, in the scope of
historical development, explain how this nation evolved from the
Progressive Era to Brown and the subsequent due process revolu-
tion. Jurisprudential developments, because of their great impor-
tance in this ultimately legal controversy, shall be considered
separately in the following section.
A. The 1920s
The decision to commence this analysis with the 1920s is re-
ally quite arbitrary, since the roots of the due process revolution
matically the status of black people in the U.S. and inspired imitative
social protests among women, gays, American Indians, and other op-
pressed groups.
Inverarity, Lauderdale & Feld, supra note 22, at 54. Through a discussion of Jews
in Western Europe and the whole civil rights movement for Blacks starting at the
Civil War, he provides a Marxist analysis demonstrating the interaction of race and
changes in the dominant modes of production leading to the reforms of the 1960s.
Id. at 54-85.
38. Richard Kluger captures the significance of Black oppression with regard to
the due process revolution: "The decision [in Brown] marked the turning point in
America's willingness to face the consequences of centuries of racial discrimination,
a practice tracing back nearly to the first settlement of the New World." Richard
Kluger, Simple Justice: A History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black
America's Struggle for Equality x (1975).
39. Shortly before this article went into print, Vincent Gordon Harding in
Wrestling toward the Dawn The Afro-American Freedom Movement and the
Changing Constitution, 74 J. Am. Hist. 718 (1987), looked at the Constitution in
American history and identified the central role race has played in the historical
evolution of that document:
Thus the magnificent irony unfolds: The Children of Africa, whose
freedom the Constitution makers sacrificed on the altar of a tenuous
and limited white unity, became the foremost proponents of freedom
and justice in the nation, demanding of the Constitution more than its
slave-holding creators dared to dream, wrestling it toward an integrity
that the Fathers could not give it. And in the process, though they
sustain significant wounds, they also provide opportunities for justice,
equity, and hope for many persons other than themselves. Indeed,
they encourage others to enter the arena with them to press the na-
tion toward its highest possibilities.
Id. at 719.
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span all of American constitutional and social history.40 Because
the ultimate focus of this article is on the roots of the due process
revolution as it relates to juvenile court procedure, and given that
the first juvenile courts were created during the Progressive Era,
the most significant events having an impact on that development
most likely occurred during the years following the Progressive
Era, starting with the 1920s.
The historical milieu of the Progressive Era which gave rise
to juvenile courts in this country changed quite drastically in the
1920s. Americans did not totally repudiate the society the Progres-
sives had created, for the Progressive Era had seen the irreversible
change of the United States into a modern urban and industrial so-
ciety.41 During the 1920s, a period marked by great prosperity
emerged. The First World War had just ended and Americans
generally lost the desire to reform and crusade for moral causes
which had marked the Progressive Era.42 Many popular nine-
teenth century values were severely eroded by the emergence of a
mass consumer society which emphasized mass advertizing, install-
ment buying, and the hedonistic appeal of the automobile. 43 The
period was also marked by the new popularity of movies, radios,
and freer sex.44 This contrasted quite sharply with the strict and
conservative Protestant middle class morals and societal structures
of a predominantly rural and small town nation-values from the
nineteenth century which the Progressive Reformers had carried
into the twentieth.4 5
The radio, the automobile, and all of the other symbols of
this newly emerging mass urban culture of the 1920s began to
bridge the gap in lifestyles which had for so long separated rural
and urban Americans.46 The diminishing differences between ur-
ban and rural dwellers-though certainly not complete by the end
40. For an historical overview of the development of the due process revolution,
and especially an analysis of the "nationalization" of the fourteenth amendment,
see Richard C. Cortner, The Supreme Court and the Second Bill of Rights: the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Nationalization of Civil Liberties (1981).
41. David A. Shannon, Between the Wars: America, 1919-1941, at 66 (2nd ed.
1979).
42. Alfred H. Kelly & Winfred A. Harbison, The American Constitution: Its Or-
igins and Developments 679-85 (2nd ed. 1963).
43. Mowrey & Brownell, supra note 28, at 110.
44. Id.
45. Shannon, supra note 41, at 66-74. For an analysis of the values of the Pro-
gressive reformers and personal backgrounds of many of the leaders of the Progres-
sive Era, see generally Robert M. Crunden, Ministers of Reform: The Progressives'
Achievement in American Civilization, 1889-1920 (1984).
46. Shannon, supra note 41, at 66-83. See also Merle Curti, The Growth of
American Thought 697-729 (1964).
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of the decade-would be a crucial development for the due process
revolution; the Brown decision and the accompanying due process
revolution depended upon a more homogeneous American society
more aware of and receptive to the values and demands of certain
sectors of the society.
Though American society changed dramatically in the 1920s,
advances in legal equality remained elusive because of a strong
conservative reaction against the emergent urban mass culture.
Prohibition, the activities of a reemerging Ku Klux Klan, and a
strong surge of anti-Catholicism and restrictive immigration poli-
cies reflected continuing rural and small town values. 47 Conflicts
between rural and urban values and Negro-white tensions under-
pinned much of this conservative reaction.48
Given the premise that race was the major catalyst behind
the due process revolution,49 the ferment occurring within the
Black community during the 1920s is crucial to any explanation
and understanding of the first part of this analysis which focuses
on explaining the occurrence of the Brown decision. In the first
decades of the twentieth century, Blacks continued to experience
discrimination under Jim Crow segregation laws in both the north
and south.50 Bizarre racial theories from the nineteenth century,
held by academicians and lay people alike, supported the wide-
spread segregation.51 In their response to this situation, the Black
community divided between followers of Booker T. Washington
with his Tuskegee Institute, and W.E.B. DuBois-a major leader in
the creation of the NAACP in 1908. While Washington advocated
a more passive and subservient approach to Black-white rela-
tions,52 DuBois and other Black intellectuals advocated universal
manhood suffrage, the abolition of all segregation laws, and the
end of race-based educational and training monopolies.53
By the 1920s, the NAACP began to use its publications to
challenge popular scientific theories of race, segregation, disen-
47. Shannon, supra note 41, at 66-67,70,72,89-93.
48. Id. at 103. Kelly & Harbison, supra note 42, at 685.
49. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
50. Kluger, supra note 38, at 105-25. See generally C. Vann Woodward, The
Strange Career of Jim Crow (3rd ed. 1974); John Hope Franklin & Isidore Starr,
The Negro in Twentieth Century America: A Reader on the Struggle for Civil
Rights (1967); John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom: A History of Negro
Americans (1974).
51. Kluger, supra note 38, at 305-14. For a more detailed discussion of the theo-
ries underlying racism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see George
M. Fredrickson, The Black Image in the White Mind: The Debate on Afro-Ameri-
can Character and Destiny, 1817-1914 (1971).




franchisement, and the general lack of Black civil rights. More
importantly for future developments, the NAACP commenced ju-
dicial challenges in which it sued various government officials for
discriminatory actions.54 The lack of success in many of these
cases revealed a source of Black harassment: helplessness before
the mystifying process of the American court system. The in-
crease in the NAACP's stature and activity during this period coin-
cided with the first major migration of Blacks to the now
burgeoning industrial cities. Numerous race riots occurred which,
given the development of a mass urban society and improved mo-
bility and communications, began to alert more people to the exist-
ence of Black legal and social deprivations. Despite wider
awareness of these problems, racism increased during this era.s s
With Blacks more frequently entering the courts under the
direction of the NAACP and leaving the stifling confines of the ru-
ral South, a Black cultural renaissance occurred in Harlem during
the 1920s. Distinct and recognized Black artists and artistic styles
marked this cultural awakening.56 Though all of this served to in-
crease Black visibility among white urban Americans and to make
Blacks more aware of their own unjust situation, most Blacks re-
mained apathetic to their plight. In addition to this apathy, courts
and legislatures refused to assist in altering the social structure of
the United States.57
B. The 1930s
With the crash of the stock market in 1929, a new period of
historical importance descended upon the United States. The
Great Depression and the subsequent New Deal proved to be even
greater catalysts for the due process revolution than any of the de-
velopments of the 1920s.
During the 1930s, a massive reorientation of the collective
American mind occurred-demonstrated by the traumatic effect of
54. See, e.g., Buchan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (the Court struck down a law
allowing a city block which had a majority of white residents living on it to bar
Blacks from moving in); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (the Court reversed
a jury conviction of some Black defendants and stated that the existence of strong
public passion had the effect of denying the defendants due process of law); Corri-
gan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926) (the Court upheld racially restrictive cove-
nants); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (the Court struck down a Texas law
which specifically denied the Negro the right to vote in a primary election).
55. See Kluger, supra note 38, at 110-11, 114-16. See generally Franklin &
Starr, supra note 50.
56. For a general discussion of the development and impact of a uniquely Black
American culture and collective consciousness, see Lawrence W. Levine, Black Cul-
ture and Black Consciousness (1977).
57. Kluger, supra note 38, at 116.
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the Depression and the response to that crisis in the form of the
New Deal. Many Americans abandoned the doctrines of laissez-
faire capitalism and Social Darwinism.58 The long-held faith in an
always bountiful and just capitalist order suffered a severe blow. 5 9
Americans in general became dissatisfied with the status quo and
became more willing to experiment with new approaches to
problems and to vocally protest current government policies.60 A
strong strain of democratic nationalism also emerged. This was
not so much patriotic chauvinism, but increasing pride and con-
sciousness with regard to the various cultural traditions and cus-
toms of the United States. An expanded acceptance of cultural
pluralism, a new social consciousness, and an increased willingness
to invest in the common good at the expense of individual freedom
accompanied these developments. 61 The world of science also
changed as scientists began to question traditional notions of cau-
sation.6 2 The belief that there were no absolute answers or simple
black and white explanations became more widespread. These
changes in the cultural and intellectual climate pervaded Ameri-
can society from 1931 until Pearl Harbor in 1941.63 This increasing
disregard of old values and methods prepared the way for the due
process revolution, which in its first stages involved disposing of
legal doctrines and social views cherished by many Americans
from the earliest years of the Republic.
With the start of the Depression, the migrations to the cities
stopped. These cities, having grown dramatically since the turn of
the century, were now full of potentially powerful and discon-
tented masses. Franklin Delano Roosevelt recognized these devel-
opments and was the first American president to become
intimately concerned with urban life and urban problems. He
found new political support in the cities; the urban middle class,
laborers, and Blacks became the backbone of the New Deal coali-
tion.6 4 The politically astute FDR overcame the divisiveness of
American society and unified those varied groups through the de-
velopment of a powerful political label-New Deal Liberalism-
which would last well into the post-war years. In this new polit-
58. Mowrey & Brownell, supra note 28, at 110; Curti, supra note 46, at 710-20.
59. Id.
60. Shannon, supra note 41, at 176-79.
61. Id.
62. Curti, supra note 46, at 702-09.
63. Id. at 698-720; Mowrey & Brownell, supra note 28, at 110; Shannon, supra
note 41, at 217.
64. Theda Skocpol, Legacies of New Deal Liberalism, Dissent 33-34 (Winter
1983); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Liberal Labe: Roosevelt's Capture of a Symbol, 17
Pub. Pol'y 377-408 (1968).
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ical coalition, FDR joined traditional Jacksonian egalitarianism
with the new values and realities of the urban masses.65
Adherents to this new ideology claimed that the nation's
problems during the 1930s resulted generally from political, eco-
nomic, and social privilege; therefore, the cure lay in the extension
of democracy, equality of opportunity, and an increase in the
power of ordinary citizens to make society's basic decisions. 66 As
this ideology would subsequently provide the intellectual frame-
work for the due process revolution, it is not surprising that sev-
eral of the Supreme Court justices who later led the due process
revolution from the nation's highest court were New Deal appoin-
tees and vigorous adherents of New Deal Liberalism.6 7
The Depression and the New Deal also led to major changes
within the political institutions of the United States. These insti-
tutional transformations, like the cultural and economic develop-
ments discussed above, would ultimately have a tremendous
impact on the occurrence of Brown and the due process revolution.
FDR believed, and the majority of Americans eventually came to
accept, that a strengthened national government remained the
only option available in dealing with the difficult problems
brought about by the Depression. Much of this newly centralized
power resided not with the legislative or judicial branches, but
with the executive branch.68 FDR, more than any other president
in American history, enjoyed immense powers throughout an un-
usually long presidency. He staffed his administrative agencies
with social reformers and New Deal engineers at a time when
those agencies exerted tremendous influence within American so-
ciety.6 9 Though generally intellectual elitists, some of the New
Deal administrators advocated the protection of civil rights for all
people, regardless of race or creed.70
This very important institutional development reflects God-
frey Hodgson's observation of a critical trend in American history
which began during the New Deal era: increasingly concentrated
power in the office of Chief Executive so as to better deal with an
increasingly complex world.71 Individuals, cities, and states during
65. See Mowrey & Brownell, supra note 28, at 79-84; Curti, supra note 46, at
716-20; Shannon, supra note 41, at 214-16.
66. Shannon, supra note 41, at 214-16.
67. Mowrey & Brownell, supra note 28, at 79-84.
68. Murphy, supra note 29, at 128-29.
69. See id. at 99-100, 128, 154; Mowrey & Brownell, supra note 28, at 108-10.
70. See John Salmond, Vanguard of the Civil Rights Movement" The Post New
Deal Career of Aubrey Willis Williams, 44 The Historian 51-58, 67-68 (Nov. 1981).
71. Hodgson, supra note 28, at 99-100. After tracing this development of the
transformation of the Office of the Presidency from the New Deal era to the bu-
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the New Deal era more frequently looked to Washington for gui-
dance, and also blamed Washington when things went wrong. This
development would have an extremely important impact on the
subsequent due process revolution, given that local communities,
courts, and legislatures often perpetrated many of the deprivations
of civil rights and liberties.72 Just as Americans would turn to the
federal government for economic help during the New Deal era,
advocates of the expansion of civil rights increasingly began to
look to the federal government for assistance in dealing with the
deprivations.
Given the centrality of race to the Brown decision and the
due process revolution, conditions within the Black community
during the 1930s help to illustrate and explain the historical devel-
opment of this revolution. Blacks were more harshly affected by
the Depression than any other group.7 3 Though Blacks had been
staunch Republicans since the time of Lincoln, during the New
Deal they overwhelmingly joined FDR in his new urban coali-
tion.7 4 The Depression decade's mood of equality, cultural plural-
ism, and other changes in basic values served to give Blacks a
boost in their long struggle for equality. Although FDR ultimately
acquiesced to a Congress and Democratic Party controlled by con-
servative southern Democrats and did not provide Blacks with the
same number of gains as he did labor and other segments of soci-
ety, the New Deal era did lay the foundation for many of the post-
war gains the Black community would enjoy. While Blacks suf-
fered economically more than other groups during the Depression,
they received more support from the federal government,7 5 proba-
bly making them more cognizant than others of this new shift in
the sources of power and influence. Hence, Blacks seemed willing
to turn away from the more conservative and often blatantly racist
local and state governments. This was a lesson they would remem-
reaucratic institution it subsequently became, Hodgson concludes of the modern
presidency:
The White House is supreme over war and peace, over economic intel-
ligence and planning, and over the power of the purse. It can, of
course, also reach out into any other particular issue that it needs to
control. For example, it reached out and took control of civil rights
under Kennedy and more particularly under Johnson. But in normal
times, the four functions that the White House routinely controls-the
budget, economics, defense, and foreign policy-make it sovereign
within the federal government.
Id. at 108-09.
72. See generally Cortner, supra note 40.
73. Shannon, supra note 41, at 227.
74. Mowrey & Brownell, supra note 28, at 206.
75. Shannon, supra note 41, at 227.
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ber after the Second World War. 76
Blacks continued to work at improving their legal and social
positions during the Depression and New Deal period. The
NAACP and Howard University Law School together became a
powerful weapon in the fight for civil rights during the 1930s. 77
Howard University emerged as a clearinghouse for the legal fight
that continued to gain momentum during the 1930s.78 This univer-
sity encouraged Black law students to be social engineers and, in
effect, it became the birth place of civil rights law. The NAACP
utilized this pool of increasingly competent civil rights lawyers to
launch a barrage of lawsuits aimed at ending racial discrimination
in various sectors of American society.7 9
Historian David Shannon boldly concludes that the above dis-
cussed developments resulted in an increase in the number of
whites outside of the South who were opposed to racial discrimina-
tion.8 0 Though he admits that concrete evidence is sparse, he sup-
ports this conclusion by citing the decrease in popularity of Amos
and Andy, the appearance of Richard Wright's Native Son 8 l as a
best seller and book-of-the-month selection, and the fact that most
Americans were outraged at Hitler's racist treatment of Jesse
Owens at the 1936 Olympics.8 2 Shannon further argues that de-
spite tension between white and Black laborers in the 1930s, some
unions realized the strength of Black labor support. Both the
UAW and the CIO insisted upon full Negro participation and often
refused to segregate the locals or accept contracts with different
wage rates for Blacks and whites.83
This changing view of racial discrimination in American soci-
ety which stemmed from the increased visibility of Blacks in urban
areas, the increased prominence of their litigation, and the increas-
ing importance of a more powerful and less racist federal govern-
76. Md See also .Richard Polenberg, One Nation Divisible: Class, Race, and
Ethnicity in the United States since 1938, at 15-45 (1980). See generally Franklin,
supra note 50. For discussions of the violence Blacks experienced at the hands of
local government entities even during the 1930s, see Dan T. Carter, Scottsboro: A
Tragedy of the American South (1979); James R. McGovern & Walter T. Howard,
Private Justice and National Concerw" The Lynching of Claud Neal, 43 The Histo-
rian 546 (1981).
77. Kluger, supra note 38, at 123.
78. Id. at 127.
79. Id. at 123, 155-73, 214. See supra note 54; infra notes 108-10, 140-42, 156, 178.
80. Shannon, supra note 41, at 227.
81. This is a novel about a Black youth growing up in a ghetto, the victim of
blatant racism. Richard Wright, Native Son (1940).
82. Shannon, supra note 41, at 227.
83. Id.
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ment within American society, paved the way for the seminal
Brown decision.
C. World War II
With the start of the Second World War, the United States
witnessed tyrannical governments destroying the ideals of liberty
and human dignity which had developed in Western culture over
the past three centuries. This development would have a most
profound impact on the way Americans came to view their own
history and their contemporary society.8 4 With the start of this
war, the previously discussed trends of a more pervasive federal
government and a strengthened chief executive continued. In the
introduction to his important study of American society during the
war years, Richard Polenberg alludes to the importance of the Sec-
ond World War to subsequent civil rights developments:
World War II radically altered the character of American soci-
ety and challenged its most durable values. The war redefined
the relationship of government to the individual and of indi-
viduals to each other, and it posed questions about the rela-
tionship between civilians and the military, between liberty
and security, and between special interests and national pur-
pose which continue to perplex Americans. Pearl Harbor
marked more than the passing of a decade; it signified the end
of an era and the beginning of a new.85
As the United States mobilized for war, the points of contact
between government and the individual increased dramatically.
Building on trends begun during the Depression and the New Deal
era, the major beneficiary of an increasing concentration of power
which accompanied the war continued to be the president and the
executive administrative agencies rather than the legislative
branch. This trend would subsequently assist civil rights leaders
by providing alternative sources of power to turn to when Con-
gress and the individual states refused to respond to the demands
of these leaders.86
Presidential power was not the only force in American soci-
ety in ascendancy during the war. Business and agriculture also
started to consolidate into huge conglomerations.8 7 The migration
to the cities, though halted temporarily by the Depression, re-
84. See generally Hodgson, supra note 28, at 16-47.
85. Richard Polenberg, War and Society- The United States, 1941-1945, at 1
(1972).
86. Kelly & Harbison, supra note 42, at 791.
87. See Mowrey & Brownell, supra note 28, at 166; See also Kelly & Harbison,
supra note 42, at 790-91.
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sumed dramatically.8 8 The increased industrial productivity which
came with a society geared up to fight a war fueled the emergence
of a consumer society in the 1950s even more expansive than the
trend begun in the 1920s.8 9 Finally, the number of women and
Blacks entering the work force increased dramatically, with labor
shortages permitting both groups to enter fields they had previ-
ously been excluded from.90
World War II also caused some perplexing developments
within the collective American psyche. A new confidence in
American values and institutions emerged as the nation fought fas-
cism and dictators. According to intellectual historian Merle
Curti, Americans came to see the United States as a sanctuary of
light and learning, with the old dream of intellectual superiority
arriving at last.91 Uneasy feelings simultaneously developed re-
garding the increased burden of becoming the world's strongest
power virtually overnight, the terrible destruction and future im-
plications resulting from the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki, and the increasingly apparent contradictions
in the way the United States treated its minority peoples. 92 Ac-
cording to historian Richard Polenberg, "American society on the
eve of World War II was sharply divided along class, ethnic, and
racial lines."93 Sharp regional contrasts continued to divide the
nation. Government officials hoped the patriotic sentiments of the
war years would ease those divisions, and, with the start of the
war, a great wave of unity did in fact sweep the nation. Beneath
the surface, however, many of the earlier racial, ethnic and urban-
rural tensions and contradictions persisted and would resurface in
the early post-war years.94
Race, that central facet of the due process revolution, re-
mained a cause of concern even during the unifying war years. De-
spite the migration of Blacks to urban areas starting in the 1920s,
in the years immediately before the war three-quarters of all
Blacks still lived in the South under strict Jim Crow laws.95
88. See Mowrey & Brownell, supra note 28, at 166.
89. See generally id., at 172-73.
90. See Karen Tucker Anderson, Last Hired, First Fired" Black Women Work-
ers during WWII, 69 J. Am. Hist. 82, 82-83 (1982).
91. Curti, supra note 46, at 728.
92. See generally Hodgson, supra note 28, at 16-47. The most notorious exam-
ples of contradictory treatment of minorities during the war years include the seg-
regation of Blacks in the armed forces and the internment of Japanese Americans
in concentration camps.
93. Polenberg, supra note 76, at 15.
94. See id. at 15-47; Curti, supra note 46, at 728-38.
95. Polenberg, supra note 76, at 25.
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Northern Blacks also continued to encounter a rigid color line.96
While FDR and other New Dealers moved very cautiously on the
race issue during the 1930s, during the war years, FDR was even
more reluctant to sponsor anti-discrimination measures that would
alienate members of Congress from the South whose support he
needed for his national defense and foreign policy initiatives.97
Though they gained in visibility and more vigorously challenged
their status in American society, Blacks remained politically impo-
tent. The war effort, however, helped to change that situation.98
During the war, twelve million men and women left home to
enter the armed forces and fifteen million civilians relocated so as
to take jobs with the burgeoning defense industry and other war-
related enterprises.99 As a result, Blacks poured into New York,
Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, the steel cities of the Great
Lakes area, and other northern urban areas. From 1940 to 1944,
the Black population in urban areas increased by forty-nine per-
cent.100 Employers in need of workers began to overlook race and
to integrate their work forces. 10 1 This influx no doubt aggravated
racial tensions, but helped the movement towards better Black or-
ganization and caused an increasingly mobile America to become
less provincial with regard to race issues.'0 2 All of these trends led
to the revolution in the treatment of Blacks which ultimately
culminated with Brown in the 1950s.
During the thirties, great advances were made in the social
sciences-particularly sociology and anthropology. This trend con-
tinued during the war years. As part of this development, many of
the nineteenth-century theories of race and cultural development
were being repudiated. For example, Franz Boas and Otto
Klineberg had challenged the idea that some races were superior
to others. Margaret Mead's popular works disseminated similar
96. Id. at 28-29.
97. Id. at 31-34. Especially in the vital areas of housing and jobs, Blacks contin-
ued to experience overt discrimination.
98. Id. at 28-34.
99. Id. at 54-55.
100. Id. at 73.
101. Id. at 74.
102. Id. at 73. As an example of the increased racial tensions which accompanied
these demographic shifts, many white homeowners in northern cities, afraid that
Blacks would expand into their neighborhoods, attempted to prevent Blacks from
living in federal housing projects. In fact, threats of violence in Buffalo, New York,
caused the government to cancel plans to build federally funded housing projects.
In Detroit, a mob of whites armed with rocks and clubs prevented Black families
from moving into federal housing projects. Eventually, the families were able to
move in, but only with a police escort. Id.
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new ideas to a broader public audience.103 This trend gained mo-
mentum as the United States fought a nation with very extreme
racist theories, and caused many Americans-not just academi-
cians-to reconsider the underlying basis for the racial segregation
and legal inequality premised on the now defunct racial theories of
the nineteenth-century.1o4
The resulting geographical shifts and increased occupational
mobility accompanied by the social, intellectual, and economic al-
terations contributed to the subsequent escalation of racial ten-
sions. From the Black perspective, the lowering of some barriers
made those that remained all the more intolerable.105 Thus, while
ethnic distinctions disappeared in the more unified and increas-
ingly mobile and homogeneous consumer society, and as class lines
narrowed with the widespread affluence brought about by the war-
time economy, racial tensions were exacerbated through the in-
creased contact and increasingly apparent inequalities and contra-
dictions in the treatment of Blacks.106
Though Black militancy increased in some labor disputes,
during the war years many Black leaders generally avoided violent
and disruptive challenges to racism. Instead, these Blacks peace-
fully sought aid from white liberals in their congressional and
court battles.107 However, white liberals who realized that the
treatment of Japanese Americans and the very existence of Jim
Crow laws were highly incongruous with the fight against racist
fascism were not yet numerous or influential enough to reverse
government policy. Blacks continued to litigate discrimination in
housing,10s transportation, 0 9 employment,110 and the military ser-
103. Id. at 70-71. See also Philip Gleason, Americans AL" World War II and the
Shaping of American Identity, 43 Rev. Pol. 483 (1981). See, e.g., Otto Klineberg,
Race Differences (1935); Otto Klineberg, Negro Intelligence and Selective Migra-
tion (1935); Franz Boas, The Mind of Primitive Man (1938); Margaret Mead, Com-
ing of Age in Samoa (1928).
104. See Polenberg, supra note 76, at 70-71, 73; Gleason, supra note 103, at 483-
502. In addition to the new theories by the above-discussed sociologists, during the
war years Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal wrote An American Dilemma: The
Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (1944) in which he criticized American op-
pression of Blacks. According to Kluger, civil rights groups seized upon this book
in their attack upon America's racial problems. Kluger, supra note 38, at 256.
105. Polenberg, supra note 76, at 78.
106. Id. at 70-78.
107. See generally Kluger, supra note 38, at 239-55.
108. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (held that though racially re-
strictive covenants were still private and legal acts of discrimination, such cove-
nants were unenforceable by resort to the courts). See also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S.
24 (1948) (companion case to Shelley).
109. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941) (held that where sepa-
rate rail cars are authorized by law, facilities provided must be equal); Morgan v.
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vice."' In years which saw an extraordinary emphasis placed
upon national unity, race remained a source of enormous division
in American life.112 The contradictions and complexities which
existed in American society during the war played a significant
role in the occurrence of Brown and the due process revolution.
D. The Post-War Years Leading up to Brown
The years following the war became increasingly tense, con-
fusing, and frustrating for the United States. Even though the
United States had emerged victorious and the most powerful na-
tion on earth, the nation became increasingly preoccupied with
fears of communism and the internal race problems only wors-
ened. Much of the tension of the era probably resulted from a ma-
jor contradiction: the United States emerged from the war the
leader of the "free world" and engaged in a struggle with the
forces of a supposedly repressive communism, while at the same
time American Blacks continued to be treated like second-rate
citizens.
In his analysis of American society, Godfrey Hodgson looked
back to the 1940s and early 1950s to find the sources of dissent and
turmoil which produced the civil rights movement of the 1960s.
First, he cites the fact that between 1941 and 1945 the United
States emerged as the strongest power in the world and ended its
long-held doctrine of isolation in foreign policy."l 3 Second, the
United States experienced much frustration in possessing such
power while also realizing that the world refused to be molded by
it.114 Third, Hodgson claims World War II ended the Great De-
pression and unleashed an economic leap forward which produced
increased prosperity and gradually engendered an ideology that
American capitalism could produce abundance on such a scale that
social problems would be drowned under a flood of resources.115
Finally, Hodgson argues that the great migration to, and isolation
Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946) (struck down state law requiring segregation on inter-
state carriers).
110. See, e.g., Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (held that
a majority union cannot enter into contracts that discriminate against non-member
minority workers).
111. For a discussion of discrimination in the armed services and the response by
the NAACP, see Kluger, supra note 38, at 226-27.
112. See Polenberg, supra note 76, at 69-78; Harvard Sitkoff, Racial Militancy
and Interracial Violence in the Second World War, 58 J. Am. Hist. 661, 662, 679
(1971). See generally Polenberg, supra note 76.
113. Hodgson, supra note 28, at 17.
114. Id.




of Blacks in, northern industrial cities with corresponding white
flight to the suburbs moved the question of race to the center of
national concerns." 6 Much of the analysis that follows will ex-
pand and apply some of Hodgson's observations of American
society.
As Hodgson's study of developments in American society dur-
ing the post-war years indicates, foreign policy concerns had a dra-
matic impact on the domestic due process revolution which
occurred during those years. For example, when the United States
found itself a superpower nation after the war and no longer able
to enjoy an isolationist foreign policy, the newly enhanced Ameri-
can presence in world affairs gave the nation an increased incen-
tive to live up to the values at home which it so vociferously
espoused abroad as it assisted in rebuilding Europe and Japan." 7
Furthermore, the federal government and an American population
experiencing a communications and transportation revolution ac-
companied by increased opportunities to follow global events gen-
erally became more sensitive to, and cognizant of, racial issues
both in the United States and in the ever-growing Third World."i8
In response to the perceived communist menace, during the
early post-war years there was a desire to affirm the fundamental
soundness of American governmental, social, and cultural institu-
tions. Sociologists of the period stressed the homogeneity and lack
of class consciousness which they said uniquely marked American
society.119 Despite such assertions of egalitarianism, activities in
Washington and the situation of Blacks in this country belied such
claims. President Truman favored legislation to promote racial
equality.120 Blacks had, after all, become visible in the northern
urban areas and a more potent political force. President Truman
urged Congress to eliminate poll taxes in federal elections, se-
verely punish lynch mobs, create a Fair Employment Practices
Committee with real authority, protect the right to vote, and elimi-
nate segregation in interstate transportation.12' Truman and other
supporters of reform tried to use the Cold War atmosphere to
116. See Hodgson, supra note 28, at 18.
117. See id. at 16-47.
118. Id. See generally Polenberg, supra note 76.
119. For sociological works of the era which stressed that United States society
had very little class divisions, unlimited social mobility, and was the model of a plu-
ralistic society, see generally David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd (1950); Reinhold
Niebuhr, The Irony of American History (1952); Editors of Fortune Magazine,
USA: The Permanent Revolution (1951), as cited by Polenberg, supra note 76, at
101-103.
120. Polenberg, supra note 76, at 108.
121. Id. See also Mowrey & Brownell, supra note 28, at 206-07.
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their advantage by arguing that the United States could improve
its image in Africa and Asia by ending Jim Crow. 22 Yet, with the
Cold War preoccupying the politicians in Washington and with
many leaders stressing a return to traditional American values,
this was hardly an opportune time to conduct a thorough and
much needed critique of American political and social institutions.
In addition to these general pressures from both abroad and
within for reform, the Cold War and McCarthyism were important
events of the immediate post-war years leading to Brown. Hodgson
persuasively argues that both the Cold War and Senator McCar-
thy's antics emerged as a result of the paranoia and frustration
which came with the realization that the United States, despite its
immense post-war power, could not completely control world
events.123 Such fears and frustrations were at the core of the In-
ternal Security Act of 1950,124 the Walter-McCarran Immigration
Bill of 1952,125 and the general destruction of due process rights
for aliens and other "radical" suspects. This rather reactionary at-
titude of the Cold War era is difficult to place within the develop-
ments leading up to Brown, other than to speculate that perhaps
the nation had gone to such an extreme in this witch hunt that an
extreme in a different direction was necessary to return to a more
balanced world view. Ultimately, the Brown holding was really a
rather isolated event in the early 1950s when it would be at least
another decade before reality began to measure up to the doctrine
espoused by the Court in that decision.'2 Nevertheless, the deci-
sion proved an important first step in the due process revolution.
The mass culture of consumption and abundance based on
the urban lifestyle which first emerged in the 1920s reached its
peak in the 1950s. Hodgson very accurately stresses this as an im-
portant post-war phenomenon.'2 7 Education aided the creation of
a mass consumer culture as formal schooling became more wide-
122. Polenberg, supra note 76, at 108-09.
123. Hodgson, supra note 28, at 17.
124. This Act, (Pub. L. No. 81-1024, 64 Stat. 987) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 781
(1950)), required Communist organizations to register with the Attorney General
and furnish complete membership lists and financial statements. It made it illegal
to conspire in any act which would "substantially" contribute to a dictatorship in
the United States. In times of an internal security emergency, the Attorney Gen-
eral was to apprehend and intern persons posing such a threat. Murphy, supra
note 36, at 291.
125. This bill, (Pub. L. No. 82-449, 66 Stat. 143) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1651
(1952) (repealed 1954)), contained provisions to prevent the admission of "possible
subversives" into the country and permitted the expulsion of "dangerous aliens."
Murphy, supra note 36, at 292.
126. See Hodgson, supra note 28, at 16-47; Polenberg, supra note 76, at 86-126.
127. Hodgson, supra note 28, at 72.
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spread and continued to make American society more homogene-
ous.128 During the 1950s many people moved into the suburbs and
into ranch-style houses of similar design; the highway system
linked the nation, as did the more pervasive forms of the mass me-
dia such as national television, the large metropolitan newspapers,
and national news magazines. Corporations and labor unions be-
came powerful national institutions, unifying people and interests
across the country. FDR's New Deal liberalism, which stressed
free market capitalism in conjunction with government support
and assistance was actually entrenched still further by the republi-
can President Eisenhower. 2 9 Political power in the rural areas de-
creased, as did regionalism and class consciousness. 3 0 With the
traditional local sources of racism losing in stature, racism moved
into the inner cities.' 3 ' Ultimately, with a more homogeneous and
increasingly interconnected nation, more people became aware of
the repression of Blacks. 3 2
In addition to the above developments, by the 1950s Ameri-
cans became obsessed with juvenile delinquency and youth cul-
ture. 3 3 The 1950s saw a dramatic increase in the number of
persons getting married and having children. This birth of a new
"baby-boom" generation created a new interest in youth culture,
youth institutions, and youth control. Government officials, soci-
ologists, law enforcement officials, and journalists all reported in-
creasing amounts of juvenile crime during this period.34 In 1953,
the Senate created a subcommittee to investigate juvenile delin-
quency.' 35 New studies on delinquency focused on the effects of
family dynamics, poverty, exploitation, race, and the role of new
youth publications, radio, movies, and television in shaping a dis-
tinctive youth culture.'36 The varied manifestations of this new
youth culture troubled an adult middle class which feared that the
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 51, 53-54, 67-76, 139-49.
131. See id. at 61.
132. See id. at 62. See also Mowrey & Brownell, supra note 28, at 169-97.
133. James Gilbert, A Cycle of Outrage: America's Reaction to the Juvenile De-
linquent in the 1950's, at 14 (1986)
134. Id. at 79.
135. Id. at 143.
136. See id. at 79-89, 127-42. Groups involved in such studies included the Na-
tional Congress of Parents and Teachers, the American Bar Association, and vari-
ous organizations representing the motion picture industry, the radio industry, and
the comics industry. Examples of studies involving these new focuses include Gun-
nar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy
(1944); Earl Koos, Families in Trouble (1946); Eleanor Sheldon Gluek, Unraveling
Juvenile Delinquency (1950); Eleanor Sheldon Gluek, Delinquents in the Making
(1952); Albert Cohen, Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang (1955); Richard
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sources of these new aspects of youth culture were to be found
among Blacks, lower class people, and juvenile delinquents.1 37
New frictions between adults and youth, along with increased at-
tention given to young people and delinquency, are important ele-
ments in explaining the occurrence of Brown-a decision which
ultimately addressed the issue of the just and equal treatment of
American youth in the classroom setting.
Despite the larger trend toward homogeneity in American so-
ciety, all was not consensus, uniformity, and prosperity. Rather, a
need for social and legal reform legislation continued. When Presi-
dents Truman and Eisenhower attempted to move in previously
uncharted directions in dealing with the social problems of the era,
other forces defeated their efforts. Examples include congressional
refusal to provide federal aid to education, to reform the system of
agricultural price supports, or to create national health insur-
ance.s3 8 Powerful pressure groups aligned themselves against
many of the reformist proposals of the late 1940s and 1950s.1
39
Blacks continued to experience discrimination in the 1950s,
and the NAACP continued its legal struggle during these post-war
years. The NAACP initiated lawsuits against discrimination in
transportation,i 40 voting,' 4 ' and education.142 The majority of
Cloward & Lloyd Ohlin, Delinquency and Opportunity (1960). See Gilbert, supra
note 133, at 79-89, 127-42.
137. Gilbert, supra note 133, at 3-7. Manifestations of this new youth culture in-
cluded rock and roll music, new clothes and hairstyles, an increasing youth inde-
pendence arising from widespread youth employment and automobile possession,
and more premarital sex and earlier marriage. Id. at 14-15, 17.
138. Polenberg, supra note 76, at 107.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948) (upheld a
Michigan law guaranteeing full and equal accommodations on public carriers); Hen-
derson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) (invalidated racial discrimination in
railroad dining car facilities).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (held that the federal
government could lawfully regulate a state primary where such an election was an
integral part of the machinery for choosing candidates for federal office); Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (held that since Texas had delegated to the Demo-
cratic Party the right to fix qualifications for party membership, barring participa-
tion by Blacks amounted to state action and was therefore unconstitutional);
Schnell v. Davis, 336 U.S. 933 (1949) (refused to review decision of lower federal
court declaring void Alabama's Boswell Amendment, which provided that voters
must be able to understand and explain any article in the state constitution in order
to register); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (extended the Allwright holding to
"private primaries" held in Texas).
142. See, e.g., Missouri ex reL Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (Missouri's
refusal to admit black applicants to its state law school was held to violate the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and the state's offer to pay fees in
another state did not remove the discrimination); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332
U.S. 631 (1948) (held that as long as Oklahoma furnished white persons with legal
education, the Black petitioner was also entitled to secure a legal education af-
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Americans declined to join the fight and presidents could not yet
ignore this political reality. Even though the nation had become
more urban and federal power continued to grow while the influ-
ence of state and local governments waned, Southern Democrats
with their frequently racist and conservative attitudes often pos-
sessed the key positions on pivotal committees in Congress.1
43
These politicians frequently defeated legislative initiatives for
equality.144 Given this situation, the whole question of racial
equality-the seed of the due process revolution-was placed in
the hands of the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court would ultimately be the federal entity taking up the task of
forcing the American people to realign the reality of American so-
ciety with the rhetoric regarding American equality and opportu-
nity.14 5 The subsequent actions taken by the United States
Supreme Court grew out of an important historical evolution of
American jurisprudence running roughly parallel to all of the
above-discussed historical developments.
III. Jurisprudential Developments and the Due Process Revolution
Great changes began to emerge in the early years of the
twentieth century in American jurisprudence.146 According to
legal historian G. Edward White, American jurisprudence through-
out the nineteenth century was premised on the validity of univer-
sal principles whose truth could not be empirically demonstrated,
but whose truth most Americans did not question. 14 7 Such princi-
ples included laissez-faire capitalism, which the Court frequently
forded by a state institution); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (held that the
Black law school established by the State of Texas did not in fact provide Blacks
with true equality in legal education, therefore, the plan violated equal protection);
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (held that requiring a
Black graduate student to sit in a special class section for blacks only, to use a spe-
cial desk in the library, and eat at a special table in cafeteria was unconstitutional
segregation).
143. Polenberg, supra note 76, at 111.
144. See id. at 107-15; Mowrey & Brownell, supra note 28, at 206-09; Hodgson,
supra note 28, at 54-60.
145. For a discussion of the disjunction between American myths and actual re-
alities throughout American history, see generally James Oliver Robertson, Ameri-
can Myth, American Reality (1980) (Especially relevant to this study are those
sections dealing with myth and reality regarding the issue of race. Id, at 92-112).
146. See generally G. Edward White, The American Judicial Tradition: Profiles
of Leading American Judges (1976). Professor White has traced the development
of American jurisprudence throughout American history by discussing the lives and
judicial philosophy of leading American jurists in the historical context of each of
their respective eras. See also, G. Edward White, Patterns of American Legal
Thought (1978).
147. White, The American Judicial Tradition, supra note 146, at 251.
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invoked to protect corporate interests at the expense of individual
rights,148 and notions of "separate but equal" in late-nineteenth
century race relations.'4 9 This philosophical setting produced what
Professor White has called "judicial oracularism."15 0 Under that
system, judges applied what they perceived as broadly accepted
"truths" and values to the questions brought before them and did
not look any further into the realities of the world around them.
In effect, under this dominant nineteenth century method of dis-
pute resolution, the legal process became a very simple syllogism
in which everyone allegedly knew the universal rule and all that
judges had to do was to apply it. 1 5 1
Beginning before and continuing throughout the First World
War, a value crisis of major proportions occurred within the
United States in general and in American jurisprudence in particu-
lar. The breakdown of simple truths and widely accepted values in
an increasingly complex industrial society marked the end of the
oracular method as the dominant approach to dispute resolution.
In its place came what has been labeled "sociological jurispru-
dence." This approach to resolving legal disputes insisted that de-
cisions be grounded in empirical observations of changing social
conditions, stressed the need to replace pure logic with experience,
and emphasized the dual responsibility of judges to preserve con-
tinuity and respond to changes in society.152
Following sociological jurisprudence and drawing upon its
methods was "judicial realism." With judicial realism, the faith in
a person's ability to find an absolute truth eroded still further.
Judicial realists believed that dispute resolution by judges was an
inherently illogical and idiosyncratic exercise; they advocated re-
ducing this irrationality as much as possible by developing,
through empirical observation, methods of predicting court
decisions. 5 3
148. See, e.g., Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 116 U.S. 307 (1886) (held that
excessive regulation without regard to corporate profits amounts to a taking of pri-
vate property for public use without just compensation or without due process of
law); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890) (held
that if a company is deprived of the power of charging reasonable rates and this
deprivation takes place in the absence of an investigation by judicial machinery,
this amounts to an unconstitutional denial of due process of law.).
149. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upheld a Louisiana statute requiring
separate railroad accommodations for Blacks and whites, with the Supreme Court
thereby putting its imprimatur upon the "separate but equal" doctrine).
150. See, e.g., White, The American Judicial Tradition, supra note 146.
151. Id. at 251-52. See generally Kelly & Harbison, supra note 42; Murphy,
supra note 29.
152. White, The American Judicial Tradition, supra note 146, at 252.
153. Id. This new cognizance by many judges of the societal conditions around
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These jurisprudential developments preceded and accompa-
nied the great judicial crisis of 1937 in which FDR lashed out at a
conservative majority on the Court which had eschewed legal real-
ism in favor of nineteenth century values and approaches to judg-
ing.154 A majority of the Supreme Court struck down much of the
early New Deal legislation. After that crisis and several personnel
changes on the nation's top tribunal, the Court sanctioned a tre-
mendous expansion of federal and state legislative attempts to reg-
ulate economic matters. Judicial realists argue that this was
necessary to deal with the difficult situations in the turbulent
American society of the period.155 After removing itself from the
area of economic legislation and reform, the Court embarked on
the formulation of an elaborate new constitutional law of civil
rights and liberties. This new realm of activity would eventually
involve the Court extensively in racial desegregation,IS6 first
amendment speech and religion protections,15 7 regulation of com-
munist activity,15 8 and legislative reapportionment.15 9
them and the use of such observations in rendering their decisions was illustrated
by Justice Cardozo of the United States Supreme Court, and by Judges Frank and
Hand on the lower federal courts. See id. at 256-68. For more detailed discussions
of legal realism, see Wilfred E. Rumble, Jr., American Legal Realism: Skepticism,
Reform, and the Judicial Process (1968); Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale,
1927-1960 (1986).
154. For a discussion of FDR's "court-packing plan," see Murphy, supra note 29,
at 128-69.
155. Id.
156. See supra notes 54, 108, 109, 140. See also Muir v. Louisiana Park Theatrical
Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1955) (vacated a lower court decision which upheld the exclu-
sion of Blacks from a private theater located in a public park and leased from the
city); Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (affirmed a lower court decision re-
quiring the abolition of racial segregation in a municipal bathing/beach facility);
Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (affirmed a decision declaring bus segregation
unconstitutional); Derrington v. Plummer, 353 U.S. 924 (1957) (refused to grant cer-
tiorari to review a lower court decision abolishing segregation in a private restau-
rant operating in a county courthouse).
157. See, e.g., Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937) (upheld
statute legalizing peaceful picketing); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (in a case
involving Jehovah's Witnesses, the Court invalidated a city ordinance prohibiting
the distribution of pamphlets without permission from the city manager); Hague v.
C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (held unconstitutional a city ordinance requiring permits
from the director of public safety for the conduct of public meetings); Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (reversed a conviction for contempt of court imposed
upon several newspaper editors and labor leaders because of their published com-
ments upon litigation pending before the California courts).
158. See, e.g., DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (invalidated the conviction
of a Communist under the Oregon criminal syndicalist law); Herndon v. Lowry, 301
U.S. 242 (1937) (the Court invoked the "clear and present danger" doctrine to in-
validate the Georgia conviction of a Communist Party organizer charged with vio-
lating a state statute against inviting insurrection).
159. See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (a plurality held that the
general topic of legislative apportionment was peculiarly political in nature and
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The entry of the United States into World War II did not dis-
rupt the Court's preoccupation with its task of redefining,
strengthening, and enlarging the scope of individual liberty and
private rights under the American constitutional system. This pre-
occupation with individual rights, which became especially pro-
nounced after the 1937 crisis and Roosevelt's Court
appointments,1 60 had been in the making for several decades. As
written, the Bill of Rights appeared to regulate only the conduct of
federal officials. Long before the due process revolution and the
Warren Court, however, the Supreme Court had held that some of
the guarantees were so fundamental-such as the first amendment
protections of press, speech, and religion16'-that state officials
were required to respect them also.162 The decisions of the War-
ren Court increasingly held that state officials were also obligated
to comply with most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights.16
3
This increased preoccupation with individual rights was prob-
ably a partial response to the growing size and pervasiveness of
government and government regulations as well as the increasing
concentrations of people within the cities of an urbanizing country.
Though the Supreme Court had demonstrated concern for civil lib-
erties and private rights during the early thirties through the opin-
ions of Justices Brandeis, Cardozo, and Stone, the liberal position
on civil liberties became dominant on the Court with FDR's ap-
therefore not a proper topic for judicial determination); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364
U.S. 339 (1960) (declared invalid an Alabama law which redrew boundaries of a city
so as to exclude all but a small fraction of the city's Black residents); Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186 (1962) (held legislative apportionment by states was properly a matter
for judicial scrutiny and possibly open to challenge under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment).
160. See supra note 154.
161. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (held an Alabama statute
prohibiting peaceful picketing invalid on its face); American Federation of Labor v.
Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941) (held that a state may not lawfully enjoin picketing
when the picketers were not parties to an immediate labor dispute); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (held a state ordinance licensing door-to-door sale
and dissemination of religious tracts unconstitutional); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516 (1945) (overturned a conviction based on a state statute requiring labor or-
ganizers to register with state officials and procure organizer's card before being al-
lowed to solicit new members); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (held
unconstitutional a local ordinance prohibiting doorbell ringing, knocking on doors,
and the like, for the purpose of distributing religious literature); Follett v. McCor-
mick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (held invalid a city ordinance licensing all vending of reli-
gious books); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (upheld the right of a
Jehovah's Witness to distribute religious literature in company-owned town);
Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946) (upheld the right of persons to conduct reli-
gious solicitation on the grounds of a government-owned housing project).
162. See generally Cortner, supra note 40.
163. See Kelly & Harbison, supra note 42, at 707, 796-97, 815-16; Shannon, supra
note 41, at 26. See generally Murphy, supra note 29.
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pointment of Justices Black and Douglas. Kelly and Harbison sum-
marize these important jurisprudential developments:
Broadly speaking, the New Deal Justices appointed by FDR
after 1937 wished to interpolate a philosophy of economic de-
mocracy, political liberalism, and individual liberty into consti-
tutional law. To this end they sought to deliberately
modernize the bill of rights, formulating new constitutional
guarantees to protect labor unions in strikes and picketing and
championing rights of racial and religious minorities.164
The Court moved with stops, starts, and retreats in the area
of civil rights and civil liberties throughout the 1930s, 1940s, and
early 1950s. Before Brown, there were celebrated individual liber-
ties cases involving flag salute controversies,165 and racial discrimi-
nation in colleges,16 6 in primary elections,167 and in housing, 6 8 as
well as clashes between individual liberties and national security
during World War 11.169 These responses were largely the result
of the new realist approach of looking directly into societal crises
rather than solely at judicial precedent, as well as of the 1937 crisis
which left the Court searching for a new constitutional niche.
Just as sociological jurisprudence and legal realism emerged
from the cauldron of an evolving and industrializing American so-
ciety, the changes occurring in the United States of the 1940s,
1950s, and 1960s also required a new judicial approach. G. Edward
White points to California Chief Justice Roger Traynor as one of
the first exemplars of a new post-war jurisprudence.170 Traynor, in
a career which spanned three decades from 1940 to 1970, looked at
the society around him and realized there were some social
problems which did not admit of rational judicial solutions. These
problems, according to Traynor, required political and legislative
164. Kelly & Harbison, supra note 42, at 797.
165. See, e.g., Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (upheld a
Pennsylvania district school board in expelling two children from the public
schools for refusal to salute the flag as part of a daily school exercise); West Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (overruled Gobitis and de-
clared unconstitutional a West Virginia flag salute statute); Taylor v. Mississippi,
319 U.S. 583 (1943) (held unconstitutional three convictions under a Mississippi se-
dition statute which made it a felony to encourage disloyalty to the United States or
to encourage refusal to salute the flag).
166. See supra note 142.
167. See supra note 141.
168. See supra note 108.
169. See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upheld military
curfew applicable only to Japanese-Americans); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944) (upheld the exclusion program placing Japanese-Americans in con-
centration camps as being within the combined federal war powers of Congress and
the President).
170. White, The American Judicial Tradition, supra note 146, at 292-96.
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action. 171 If legislative branches remained inactive, certain social
issues might remain unresolved if the courts did not act.172 Fur-
thermore, judicial inaction was contrary to the historic function of
courts to protect individual rights and liberties from governmental
and majority demands. Justice Traynor responded to this dilemma
of the post-war era by advancing a new jurisprudence which recog-
nized that rationality was the essence of judging. He believed
judges should also not suppress their intuitive senses of fairness
and justice where individual rights were concerned, but rather
should articulate reasoned justifications for them. White con-
cludes that Traynor became an important architect of a judicial
role compatible with the activities of a modern liberal state in
which making choices between conflicting social values was an as-
pect of the judge as lawmaker.173
The Warren Court reflected the developments of sociological
jurisprudence, judicial realism, and the methods employed by Jus-
tice Traynor. In reflecting these jurisprudential developments, the
Brown opinion is replete with sociological studies of racism, in-
cluding the famous study done by Gunnar Myrdal.174 Like Justice
Traynor, many members of the Warren Court took upon them-
selves a more activist role at a time when other branches of gov-
ernment either refused to constructively deal with the social crises
of the period or were thwarted in their efforts. The Warren Court
was a product and illustration of its historical period, and several
of its members shared the values of modern liberalism which had
been formulated as a result of the Depression, the New Deal, the
FDR presidency, and all of the accompanying developments. This
was evidenced through judicial initiatives and through their sup-




174. Myrdal, supra note 104. This work was published in 1944 and reflected the
changing racial theories of anthropologists and sociologists in the 1930s and 1940s as
discussed above. See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text. Also cited in
footnote 11 of the Brown decision are K.B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice and Discrimi-
nation on Personality Development (1950); Witmer & Kotinsky, Personality in the
Making (1952); Deutscher & Chein, The Psychological Effects of Eforced Segrega-
tion.. A Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26 J. Psychology 259 (1948); Chein, What
are the Psychological Fffects of Segregation Under Conditions of Equal Facilities? 3
Int. J. Opinion & Attitude Res. 229 (1949); Brameld, Educational Costs, in Discrimi-
nation and National Welfare (MacIver ed. 1949); and Frazier, The Negro in the
United States (1940). Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494-95, n.11 (1954).
175. See Murphy, supra note 29, at 272-78, 458-85; White, The American Judicial
Tradition, supra note 146, at 318-25. For additional studies of the Warren Court,
see Louis M. Kohimeier, God Save this Honorable Court (1972); Alexander Bickel,
supra note 26; Archibald Cox, supra note 26. For studies of developments preced-
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Warren Court initiatives which best illustrate this new jurispru-
dence and the emergence of the due process revolution involve
cases dealing with equal voting rights,176 the rights of those ac-
cused of criminal offenses,177 and school desegregation.178
Certainly at the core of Brown-and indeed of the whole due
process revolution-was the race issue. It was an issue which had,
according to Louis Kohlmeier, "plagued the conscience of America
longer, led to more violence, [and has been] a bigger wart on her
ing the Warren Court, see C. Herman Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court: A Study in
Judicial Politics and Values, 1937-1947 (1963); C. Herman Pritchett, Civil Liberties
and the Vinson Court (1954).
176. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (outlawed the all-white
Jaybird organization primaries which had controlled the party's nominations);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (held that the equitable apportionment of voters
among districts from which members of the state legislature are chosen is justicia-
ble and not a political question); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (invalidated
the unequal apportionment of congressional districts in Georgia on the ground that
since every voter is equal to every other voter, the districts from which representa-
tives are chosen must be as nearly equal as practicable in population); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (extended the principle of "one man, one vote" so as to
invalidate the unequal apportionment of seats in both houses of the Alabama
legislature).
177. See, e.g., Mallory v. United States 354 U.S. 449 (1957) (confession held inva-
lid as evidence in federal court because it had been obtained from a defendant
while he was being detained by arresting officers for an unduly long time); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (held that evidence secured without an authenticated
search warrant must be excluded in a state prosecution); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (held that included among the fundamental rights guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment is the sixth amendment right to be represented by
counsel when being tried for any crime in a state court); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964) (the refusal of police to honor an accused's request to consult an
attorney, the obtaining of a confession from the accused after failing to advise him
of his rights, and the admission of such a confession into evidence by a state court
held to be a denial of due process); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966) (prior to
any questioning a suspect in the hands of police authorities must be informed of the
right to remain silent, that anything said can be used against the person in court,
that the person has a right to the presence of an attorney, and that an attorney will
be provided if the person cannot afford one, and failure to give such a warning ren-
ders any subsequent confession inadmissible as evidence); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967) (brought electronic surveillance within the purview of the
fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (first case in which the requirement of a jury trial
was incorporated into the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of due process).
178. Boling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (ordered the desegregation of the pub-
lic schools of the District of Columbia); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (the Court held the segregation of Black students in the public schools to be
unconstitutional); Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (the Court or-
dered lower courts and local authorities to implement the decision with "all delib-
erate speed"); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (refused to grant the Little Rock
School Board a stay against integration); Faubus v. Aaron, 361 U.S. 197 (1959) (af-
firmed lower court's holding that Arkansas' school closure statutes were unconsti-
tutional under the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment); Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 364 U.S. 500 (1960) (approved a
lower court's denunciation of the interposition doctrine).
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Constitution" than any other issue.17 9 The historical and jurispru-
dential developments outlined above led to this opportunity for the
Supreme Court to strike out against the scourge of unequal treat-
ment. It is in large part because of the Warren Court's moral lead-
ership that the due process revolution began and ultimately caused
Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson to possess the
political courage to support the Warren Court's leadership in the
Civil Rights movement. 8 0
The role of the Court and its influence, however, went be-
yond the various branches of the government. The American peo-
ple came to support the view espoused by Felix Frankfurter that
the Supreme Court had acquired a moral function which included
the duty of ascertaining the conscience of American society.' 8 ' In
speaking of the acceptance of this role the Supreme Court had cast
for itself, 8 2 Fred Graham captured the essence of the due process
revolution in the following observation:
For the most part, Americans have embraced this idea .... [I]t
has seemed a good thing to have a third branch that is geared
to reflect the nation's idealism. So the public in general ap-
plauded when the Supreme Court outlawed legal segregation
in 1954 and unfairly apportioned legislatures in 1964, although
neither move was politically feasible through the legislative
process at the time. 8 3
IV. Conclusion: the Reaction to Brown and the Years
Leading up to Gault
As a result of the long historical and jurisprudential develop-
ments detailed above, the time was ripe in 1954 for a unanimous
Supreme Court to hand down the Brown v. Board of Education
decision. This completes the first part of the analysis of why Gault
occurred when it did. In Brown, the Court focused on the unequal
treatment of one sector in society based solely on their status and
age-old theories and practices. The Court held as follows:
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine
179. Kohlmeier, supra note 175, at 30.
180. See generally Robert E. Gilbert, John F. Kennedy and Civil Rights for
Black Americans, 12 Presidential Studies Q. 386 (Summer 1982); James D. Calder,
Presidents and Crime Contro" Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon and the Influences of
Ideology, 12 Presidential Studies Q. 574 (Fall 1982).
181. See Graham, supra note 25, at 2.
182. See Robert G. McClosky, The American Supreme Court 15 (1960). Alexis
de Toqueville said: "The power of the Supreme Court is immense, but it is power
springing from opinion .... They are all powerful so long as the people consent to
obey the law; they can do nothing when they scorn it." As cited in Graham, supra
note 25, at 2.
183. Graham, supra note 25, at 2.
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of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational fa-
cilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the
plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions
have been brought are, by reason of the segregation com-
plained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 4
Though it is beyond the scope of this article to describe all of
the subsequent attempts to equalize the treatment of other sectors
in American society which resulted from Brown, a brief catalogue
of subsequent events helps explain why Gault occurred when it
did and illustrates the connection between the Brown decision and
the constitutional domestication of the juvenile court in In re
Gault.
While Brown focused narrowly on racial discrimination in
public education, the case did serve to highlight the general issue
of racial inequality. The clear mandate in Brown for racial equal-
ity in public schools also provided support for the tactics used in
the subsequent civil rights movement in which activists battled ra-
cial discrimination in its many forms. The overtly hostile reaction
of many persons in the South, and indeed across the nation, to the
Brown decision encouraged numerous Blacks and other sympa-
thetic persons to adopt tactics of direct action in dealing with vari-
ous aspects of racial inequality.1 8 5 Direct action methods ranged
from voter registrations to civil disobedience and highly visible
protests, marches, and speeches-all of which could be brought
into the homes of many Americans via the increasingly pervasive
national news media. Thus, Brown not only touched off a change
in the laws, but also a change in tactics and attitudes.ls8 This
trend toward the increased use of direct action really began during
the economic recessions of 1953 and 1954 when the large number
of Blacks concentrated in urban centers experienced an increase in
unemployment. These developments were coupled with a revolu-
tion in Black expectations flowing from Brown and the other
changes in post-war America. 8 7 Specific incidents of the use of
direct action in dealing with the race question after Brown include
Rosa May Parks' refusal to give up her bus seat in 1955, Martin
Luther King's organization of boycotts and his creation of the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the freedom rides of
CORE, activities of students from the North in the voter registra-
tion drives in the South, and marches on Washington. This active
184. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
185. See William L. O'Neill, Coming Apart: An Informal History of America in
the 1960s, at 159 (1971).
186. See id. at 158-75.
187. See Hodgson, supra note 28, at 61-62.
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push for an end to racial inequality after Brown had its source in
the above-discussed historical and jurisprudential developments
which culminated in the Brown decision.'8 8
In addition to the civil rights movement, other post-Brown
events which resulted from that seminal case also serve to illus-
trate the expansion of the due process revolution and the subse-
quent full-flowering of this revolution. For example, Alexander
Bickel argues that following naturally after Brown, the Warren
Court declared Bible reading and all other religious exercises in
public schools unconstitutional, 8 9 ordered reapportionment of the
House of Representatives and the state legislatures, 9 0 and limited
government intrusions into areas of privacy. 19 1 The due process
revolution ignited by Brown reached its most spectacular heights
in the area of criminal procedure at both the state and federal
levels. Through its numerous decisions, the Supreme Court en-
hanced the rights of the accused, tightened the rules for reason-
able searches and seizures, and implemented new rules for police
conduct.192 These protections reflected a new concern with fair-
ness in the treatment of yet another segment of American soci-
ety--criminal defendants. The same concern, flowing directly
from Brown and related post-Brown developments, ultimately was
extended to juvenile offenders in Gault.
Fred Graham captures the importance of the Brown decision
188. See O'Neill, supra note 185, at 158-65. Certainly several aspects of the cul-
mination of the due process revolution in the treatment of Blacks-besides the
Supreme Court decisions- would include the integration of all interstate busses,
trains, and terminals in 1961, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Voting Rights
Act of 1965. For a more detailed look at the civil rights movement, see Thomas R.
Brooks, Walls come Tumbling Down: A History of the Civil Rights Movement,
1940-1970 (1974); August Meier & Elliot Ruduick, CORE: A Study in the Civil
Rights Movement, 1942-1968 (1973). For a study of the women's movement, grow-
ing out of the civil rights movement, see Sara Evans, Personal Politics: The Roots
of Women's Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left (1980).
189. E.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); School Dist. v. Schemp, 374 U.S.
203 (1963).
190. E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
191. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
192. See supra note 177. See also Bickel, supra note 26, at 7-8. For additional
studies of the Warren Court in general, and its work for criminal defendants in par-
ticular, see supra note 175. See also Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of
Criminal Procedure: the Warren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 Geo.
L.J. 185 (1983); Stephen A. Saltzerg, Forward.- The Flow and Ebb of Constitutional
Criminal Procedure in the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 Geo. L.J. 151 (1980);
Russell W. Galloway, Jr., The Third Period of the Warren Court Liberal Domi-
nance (1962-1969), 20 Santa Clara L. Rev. 773 (1980); Jerold H. Israel, Criminal
Procedure, the Burger Court and the Legacy. of the Warren Court, 75 Mich. L. Rev.
1319 (1976); Symposium: The Warren Court, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 219 (1968); Francis A.
Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice.- The Warren Court and the Criminal
Cases, 1975 U. Ill. L. F. 518 (1975).
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and the subsequent broadening of the due process revolution when
he discusses the strong tie between racism and the increased con-
cern for the rights of criminal defendants:
As if it were not unfortunate enough to have a revolution in
defendants' rights coincide with a crime scare, both develop-
ments are complicated further by their subtle connection with
the problem of the Negro. The Supreme Court was drawn into
reforming the criminal law when it set out to give Negroes
equal rights before the civil laws and was faced with the ab-
surdity of leaving them with no effective constitutional rights
before the criminal law. Having outlawed Jim Crow, the
Court had to humble John Law.19 3
The Kennedy presidency also illustrates the expansion and
pervasiveness of the Brown decision. Political realignments had
occurred to such an extent that JFK could court the urban and
Black vote and respond to their demands without the fear of polit-
ical reprisals from the electorally important South. 194 He exposed
Americans to the poverty which existed in their country and asked
for change. He instituted the Peace Corps which, along with an in-
creasingly inquisitive powerful and centralized media,195 exposed
Americans to the plight of third world peoples and to the upsurge
of non-White peoples around the world who demanded dignity and
self-rule.196 He pressured government officials to enforce the anti-
discrimination laws to hire Blacks,19 7 used executive orders to
combat housing and employment discrimination, 198 and initiated
litigation'99 and actively sought legislation for civil rights.200
Through appointments, JFK strengthened the liberal majority of
the Warren Court.20 1 Those Justices making up the Warren ma-
jority-Warren, Black, Brennan, Douglas, and Fortas, who was
later replaced by Goldberg-adhered to the basic tenets of New
Deal liberalism, which included faith in the responsible use of
power by government officials.202 JFK was also concerned with
juvenile crime. In the spirit of equal opportunity engendered by
Brown, Kennedy explained the existence of juvenile delinquency
by locating its source in youth unemployment and a general lack
of youth programs and activities. By the 1960s, juvenile delin-
193. Graham, supra note 25, at 12.
194. See Hodgson, supra note 28, at 146-49.
195. See id. at 61.
196. See id.
197. See Murphy, supra note 29, at 356.
198. See id. at 355-57.
199. See id. at 355-56.
200. See id. at 354-57.
201. See Graham, supra note 25, at 17.
202. See id. at 17-18.
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quency was no longer an isolated or local matter, but a national
concern.203 Thus, with a post-Brown nation concerned about equal
and just treatment of discrete sectors of the American population
coupled with this on-going concern with juvenile delinquency, it
was only a matter of time before the due process revolution would
arrive at the door of the juvenile court.
Accompanying this society-wide expansion of the Brown
mandate was the break-up of the consensus of New Deal liber-
alism in the mid-1960s. People began to question what the state
was doing and who it was serving; the state became less legitimate
and more removed from larger society; there was a sense of
bureacracy run amuck and beyond control. From 1963 to 1965 in
particular, the United States experienced a period of great tumult
and unrest: JFK was assassinated, the Civil Rights movement
splintered, and the Vietnam War continued to escalate. Many peo-
ple-especially the younger generations-came to view the govern-
ment as blatantly hypocritical. During the later 1960s, there was a
new stress on pluralism within American liberalism accompanied
by a sweeping critique of long-held beliefs, ideals, and
institutions.204
It was during this period of the concurrent breakdown of the
New Deal consensus and the expansion of the Brown legacy that
the issue of procedural due process for juvenile offenders reached
the United States Supreme Court. Especially when one considers
certain aspects of the breakdown of the liberal consensus, the pe-
riod was certainly one in which youth, youth culture, and youth
rebellion were highly visible. Many young people reacted to the
Vietnam War while others criticized what they saw as a hypocriti-
cal, impersonal, and materialistic society. These young people cre-
ated a counter-culture which displayed youth behavior markedly
different from any past behavioral trends of American youth.205
203. See Gilbert, supra note 133, at 212-17. James Gilbert asserts that under
JFK, anti-delinquency programs became more important than ever before-as illus-
trated by the creation of the Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Cul-
ture in 1961. He also argues that these same planners and their concerns were
central to LBJ's antipoverty programs. Id. at 216.
204. See O'Neill, supra note 185, at 233-71.
205. William L. O'Neill defined "counter-culture" as follows:
The term itself was hard to define, as it embraced almost everything
new and anti-Establishment, however frivolous. On its deepest level
the counter-culture was the radical critique of Herbert Marcuse, Nor-
man 0. Brown, and even Paul Goodman. It also meant the New Left,
communes and hippie farms, magic, hedonism, eroticism, and public
nudity. And it included rock music, long-hair, and mini-skirts (or, al-
ternatively, fatigue uniforms, used clothes, and the intentionally ugly
or grotesque).
O'Neill, supra note 185, at 258. For a discussion of youth during this period and
1987]
Law and Inequality [Vol. 5:513
Much of the hostility probably came from living in a society which
was struggling and seemingly failing to more broadly apply the
principles so painfully arrived at in Brown. The rebellious re-
sponse of many of the young people to this situation no doubt
served to highlight the problem of juvenile delinquency and estab-
lish youth as yet another discrete sector of American society de-
manding fair treatment by the State.
Gerald Gault was arrested during this period when the nation
was concerned about and dealing with the implications of Brown v.
Board of Education. Yet, Gerald Gault was handled by an institu-
tion whose procedures and purposes reflected the United States at
the start of the twentieth century-an era far removed and very
different from a post World War II and post-Brown American soci-
ety. It took a complex historical and jurisprudential development
pushed by the issue of racial discrimination to bring about the
Brown decision and the extension of its principles beyond Blacks
to numerous other discrete groups within American society, in-
cluding juvenile offenders. In re Gault and its progeny206 grew out
of that Brown legacy and had the effect-at least in theory-of ex-
tending the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal pro-
tection of the law to the young people who would appear before
juvenile courts throughout the United States.
throughout American history, see generally Kett, supra note 20; H. Warren Button
& Eugene F. Provenzo, Jr., History of Education and Culture in America (1983).
206. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (held that the constitutional
safeguard of "proof-beyond-a-reasonable doubt" is as much required during the ad-
judication stage of a delinquency proceeding as the constitutional safeguards pro-
vided by Gault); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (juveniles being tried before
juvenile courts have double jeopardy protections); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707
(1979) (applied the "totality of circumstances" approach to juveniles to determine
whether a person has voluntarily waived the constitutional right to remain silent
when about to be interrogated); R.W.T. v. Dalton, 712 F.2d 1225 (8th Cir. 1983)
(juveniles who are detained because they are suspected of committing criminal acts
must be afforded a prompt probable cause hearing).
Some post-Brown cases have limited the rights of juveniles. See, e.g., McKeiver
v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (trial by jury in a juvenile court's adjudicatory
stage is not a constitutional guarantee); Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204 (1978) (a sys-
tem in which an accused juvenile is subjected to a single proceeding which begins
with a master's hearing and culminates with an adjudication by a judge does not
violate double jeopardy); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (school officials
need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their authority,
with the legality of the search depending on its reasonableness under all of the cir-
cumstances).
See also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (a case coming down the
year before Gault and holding that for there to be a valid waiver of jurisdiction by
the juvenile court there must be (1) a hearing; (2) access by counsel to the records
and reports; and (3) a statement of reasons).
